INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITY FOR THE ARMORED AND INFANTRY BRIGADE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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

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Presently, no organic information operations (IO) capability exists in the organization and structure of the armored and infantry brigade, so these brigades are unable to effectively plan, integrate, and coordinate IO activities into the brigadeŸs operations without assistance. As the Army transforms to a more modular force that will rely heavily on the ability of brigades to conduct operations using assets normally associated with higher echelons or services, this capability becomes more relevant to the brigade to ensure success. This study analyzed field manuals, after-action reviews, lessons learned, and professional articles to determine the importance of IO to the brigade and to ascertain if a need existed for brigades to have their own ability to plan and coordinate IO activities. A survey was utilized to gain opinion from Army field grade officers attending the ArmyŸs Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to confirm the need for IO at brigade level. The study then provided a potential solution to the organizational structure that should be organic to the brigade to provide the needed IO capability. Based on the research conducted, evidence exists that there is a need for a trained, permanent IO staff member at the brigade level who can ensure that IO is fully planned, coordinated, and integrated into the brigadeŸs missions and operations.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITY FOR THE ARMORED AND INFANTRY BRIGADE, by MAJ Timothy A. Brumfiel, Sr., 84 pages.

Presently, no organic information operations (IO) capability exists in the organization and structure of the armored and infantry brigade, so these brigades are unable to effectively plan, integrate, and coordinate IO activities into the brigade's operations without assistance. As the Army transforms to a more modular force that will rely heavily on the ability of brigades to conduct operations using assets normally associated with higher echelons or services, this capability becomes more relevant to the brigade to ensure success. This study analyzed field manuals, after-action reviews, lessons learned, and professional articles to determine the importance of IO to the brigade and to ascertain if a need existed for brigades to have their own ability to plan and coordinate IO activities. A survey was utilized to gain opinion from Army field grade officers attending the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to confirm the need for IO at brigade level. The study then provided a potential solution to the organizational structure that should be organic to the brigade to provide the needed IO capability. Based on the research conducted, evidence exists that there is a need for a trained, permanent IO staff member at the brigade level who can ensure that IO is fully planned, coordinated, and integrated into the brigade's missions and operations.

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Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my wife Tierney and children Shea, Tim Jr., Paige, and Alyssa who have supported my thesis efforts and tolerated me during the numerous days and nights.

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After-Action Review
AR	Armor
CA	Civil Affairs
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CND	Computer Network Defense
CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
CNO	Computer Network Operations
EW	Electronic Warfare
FM	Field Manual
IN	Infantry
IO	Information Operations
MD	Military Deception
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPSEC	Operational Security
PA	Public Affairs
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UA	Unit of Action

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In today's Army, infantry and armored brigades provide the basic building block for determining the size and structure of units that deploy globally on operations. In fact, many of today's operations are made of infantry or armored brigades that have task organized assets that are normally associated with division or above to provide a necessary capability for the theater in which they operate. In order to meet the challenges of a world with multiple threats, these brigades have to possess the capability to rapidly deploy and successfully complete assigned missions across the full spectrum of operations with minimal assistance and augmentation from a higher headquarters. At the time of this thesis publication, the Army will have taken large steps to transform brigades into units of action that meet the standard of being alerted, rapidly deployed and then employed with minimal augmentation. "Our strategic reality is the need for smaller, more agile units . . . and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. . . . Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, recent operations increasingly have witnessed deployment and employment of multi–functional brigade combat teams of various types in varying combinations" (Draft Army White Paper: Serving a Nation At War, 2004).

Typically, US Army maneuver brigades have proven very capable in performing their tactical combat tasks, but still rely on assets from division or higher to ensure mission accomplishment. In particular, Army brigades lack the organizational ability to

fully ensure information superiority. This study will focus on one important capability not normally found in most brigades in the US Army--Information Operations (IO).

Problem Statement

Armored and infantry brigades have the knowledgeable staff to develop plans and successfully command and control tactical combat operations, but lack the experience and training to successfully integrate IO into the missions they may be asked to perform across full spectrum operations. Information operations are an important element of today's operations and may be equally or more important in future operations. As a component of information superiority, IO ensures freedom of action and ultimately assists in the attainment of long-term strategic and operational objectives. If the Army's goal for the future force is to create brigades or units of action (UAs) that can deploy and function with minimal assistance from a higher unit, then brigades must have some built-in capabilities that are normally associated at higher echelons. If the Army is going to expect brigades to operate relatively independent from a higher headquarters to accomplish a mission, then brigades should possess the capability to plan, coordinate, and execute information operations to attain information superiority.

Thesis Question

IO is a relatively immature field in the US Army and to this date, most of the focus of IO has been placed at division level and above. As the Army transforms, some changes must be made to transition capabilities normally associated with division or above to commanders of brigades. In particular, the IO capability must transition to the maneuver brigade. The question to be researched is: What is the best organic

organizational structure to provide the maneuver brigade with the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate IO into the brigade's tactical missions?

Subordinate Questions

The most important point of consideration is how important is IO in determining operational success in the operational environment of today and the future? A logical conclusion could be made that IO must be important because the Army has invested time, energy, and resources into developing this field. IO may be important generally, but the level of importance of IO at the maneuver brigade level must also be determined prior to suggesting how to provide the capability.

The second point to be considered is the current structure and level of knowledge the brigade staff has about IO. The current structure of brigade staffs would suggest that the knowledge and experience level does not exist to support successful integration of IO into the operations of a brigade. The thesis question will answer if modification to the brigade staff structure is necessary to effectively synchronize IO with other battlefield operating system's actions.

The third point to be considered is how effective the Army currently is in providing IO assistance from headquarters or units from outside the brigade. If brigades need IO assistance in operations today, they receive an individual or team from another unit or higher headquarters to assist them. While this process may have achieved success in the past, the argument can be made that this is inefficient and creates conditions that limit the potential of IO in support of the brigade's operations.

Finally, it is important to determine if IO deserves a coordinating staff position at the brigade level or if the function can be embedded under control of the brigade S3.

According to FM 3-13, at division level and above, IO is placed under the responsibility of the G-7. A separate coordinating staff section may not be a necessary requirement at the brigade level considering the smaller size of brigade staffs and level of experience.

Significance of the Study

This study will assist the Army in viewing the relevance of IO at the maneuver brigade level. The capabilities of brigades should increase as the army transforms to a more agile and versatile force. The foundation of Army transformation is information superiority (see first, understand first, and act first), so brigades should inherently possess this capability in some form and rely less on a higher headquarters and other units.

Background

Precedent has been seen in many of the operations conducted over the past decade that infantry and armored brigades are deployed and employed as the primary unit under a given headquarters: In Bosnia, a brigade was deployed and its staff augmented a division staff to command and control Multi-national Division North (MND(N)); in Kosovo, one brigade deployed and its staff was augmented by elements of the division staff to command and control Multi-national Brigade East (MNB(E)); currently, a brigade in Afghanistan has its capabilities increased by assets normally seen at division and echelons above division (EAD); and brigades in Iraq are operating in a manner that requires their higher headquarters to provide subordinate units as much latitude as possible to be successful in each of their areas of operation (AO).

In each of the operations mentioned above, brigades were task organized with some element of IO however, armored and infantry brigades currently do not possess the

expertise to fully understand IO and coordinate the assets executing an IO campaign developed at an echelon above brigade. Current after-action reviews (AARs) from Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that IO was not seriously thought of or integrated well into pre-combat and combat operations. Ultimately, all combat operations lead to a post-hostilities phase where rebuilding may occur. Successful information operations during combat can assist in the transition to post-hostility operations.

The post-hostilities phase of any operation conducted today and in the future is very important since it is the phase where our nation's long-term strategic objectives will most likely be achieved. These long-term objectives are achieved in large part through successful information operations. In light of how armored and infantry brigades are deployed and employed on today's battlefield and how the Army plans to use them in the future, it makes sense to provide them a built in capability to develop, coordinate, and execute information operations.

As the Army transforms, there is more reliance on the capability of the brigade to take action independently or, at a minimum, have the ability to operate with broad guidance from its higher headquarters. It is critical that all armored and infantry brigades have a "built in" IO capability since it is the brigade's soldiers that have the most interaction with the local population of the country where they are operating. The soldiers of the brigade are the ones to most likely implement the IO campaign that is planned and coordinated at a higher level of command.

Assumptions

The deployment timeline of armored and infantry brigades will provide little to no time for training with units that may be task organized to the brigade. Armored and

infantry brigade staff officers and commanders will require better understanding of how IO assists in achieving tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Information operations will continue to be important in Army operations and permeate every phase of an operation from deployment through execution to redeployment.

Key Terms

FM 3-13, published in November 2003, defines IO as the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. When the term "brigade" is used throughout this thesis, it refers to the maneuver brigades of infantry and armor and includes cavalry regiments. The term "brigade" does not include stryker brigades or enhanced brigades.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study will focus on the need and importance of an organic organizational staff structure to provide an IO capability at the brigade level and will provide potential solutions to fill the IO capability void that currently exists in maneuver brigade staffs. Training for IO personnel at the brigade level and the necessary equipment that provide the IO capability at brigade level will not be addressed in this study. The organization of stryker brigades and enhanced brigades in the Army National Guard will not be compared or evaluated for this study. Prior to the writing of this thesis, the experience of both types of these brigades fell primarily into the arena of training. The focus of research for this thesis will be on units that have deployed to "real world" operations versus

training deployments at combat training centers or warfighters. Numerous articles exist that generally discuss IO and opinions associated with IO, but little information exists pertaining specifically to IO at the brigade level. Because of the lack of research focus at the brigade level, a survey will be completed that gains opinion of field grade officers who have experience at the brigade level.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A survey of literature will be used to determine the role and importance of IO on the modern battlefield and also be used to determine how well IO is currently integrated at the brigade level. This background information and analysis of the literature will form a basis from which opinion can be gained to determine the best organizational structure for brigades to attain an IO capability. The majority of literature used for this study will come from AARs from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia with emphasis on AARs from Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). Army field manuals (FMs) and published professional articles will provide current doctrinal background and techniques and procedures related to IO.

Source Review

Several Army FMs address IO in today's Army. These manuals are important to reference to understand current thinking about IO and also to reference for potential doctrinal changes.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. Its foundation is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

FM 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team*, establishes doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the mechanized infantry and armored brigade. This manual discusses information superiority as well as some of the components of IO that may be integrated into the brigade's operations.

FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,* is a new manual and is the Army's key integrating manual for IO, this manual prescribes IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also establishes doctrine and TTP for the IO elements of operations security and military deception.

FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces,* establishes G7 as the coordinating staff section responsible for IO and provides understanding of how IO relates to the commander's battlefield visualization.

Also relevant to review is the *Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2006 – 2023*. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), as the Army's institutional strategy, represents the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. While IO is not directly discussed in this guidance, it is important to understand the vision of the future Army because the vision shows the importance of IO integration in Army future operations.

Arleigh A. Burke, Chair in Strategy, from The Center for Strategic and International Studies published *The Current Military Situation in Iraq* on 14 November 2003. Comments from senior government officials in Iraq are in the document as well as observations from two US Divisions in the country. The document provides general observations about operations in Iraq that cover a broad range of topics and concerns from people operating within the country. Some of the topics covered are: perceived and real threats in Iraq to include insurgent and terrorist forces, quality of life for soldiers, the nuclear, biological and chemical situation, and assessment from units about various threat activities in country. Observations about IO (negative and positive) are in the document

and discuss the role of IO in Iraq in assisting commanders in their areas of responsibility. This document may be used in part to shape policy concerning Iraq.

An article by George K. Muellner was published *in Aviation Week and Space Technology* on 15 December 2003. The article is titled "Battlefield 2030" and suggests that "the determinants of success on the battlefield of 2030 will not be aircraft, ships or tanks, but rather, the exploitation of knowledge and speed of execution based on that knowledge" (p. 76).

The notes from the 34th Annual IFPA / Fletcher School Conference: Security Planning and Military Transformation After Iraqi Freedom that was held on 2 and 3 December 2003 provide insight into the military's transformation. Each of the service chiefs of staff made comments pertaining to their particular service. The purpose of the conference was to discuss challenges and opportunities facing the United States and Coalition Partners as they develop and implement politico-military strategies for the twenty-first century. Pertaining to this study are comments from the Director, Office of OSD Force Transformation, Art Cebrowski, that relate to computers and computer attack.

Lessons learned and AARs are available through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other sources concerning operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. These AARs typically cover each of the battlefield operating systems as well as other topics that may have positively or negatively impacted the unit during their operation. Changes to doctrine and TTPs may be made based on the content in each of these documents. The AARs typically follow the format of issue, discussion, and recommendation. The following is a list of AARs to be used to support this study:

1. Final Draft OIF AAR, 12 May 2003, 3d Infantry Division.

2. OEF Initial Impressions Report, September 2002, Combined Arms Assessment Team.

3. V Corps Road to Victory in OIF Brief, 19 June 2003.

4. Draft Observations and Lessons Learned from Task Force Devil, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division (OEF)

5. Lessons Learned by the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1 May 2003, 82nd Airborne Division Memo, signed by Charles H. Swannack, Major General, United States Army, Commanding.

6. OIF Lessons Learned Conference Results, January 2004, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the methodology and design is described to determine the best organization to provide maneuver brigades the capability to perform IO. The study seeks to answer the following questions:

The primary research question: According to published documents and leader's opinions, what is the best organic organizational structure to provide the maneuver brigade with the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate IO into the brigade's tactical missions?

Subordinate questions to be answered:

1. According to published documents what is the role of IO on the battlefield and, in particular, what is the role of IO at the tactical level?

2. According to published documents and leader's opinions, how important is IO in determining operational success in the operational environment of today and the future?

3. According to published documents, is there a need to improve IO at the brigade level?

4. According to leader's opinions, how important is IO in achieving success at the tactical level?

5. According to published documents and leader's opinions, how effective has the Army been in integrating IO into recent operations?

6. According to leader's opinions, how effective is the Army in providing IO assistance from headquarters outside the brigade?

7. According to leader's opinions, does the brigade staff have the experience and level of knowledge necessary to support successful integration of IO into a brigade's operations?

8. According to leader's opinions, do brigades need a full time capability to plan, integrate and coordinate IO activities into the brigade's tactical missions?

The methodology to answer the questions concerned in this thesis will explain how data will be received and analyzed, and the survey instrument to be used will all be explained in this chapter.

Methodology

There are two parts to the methodology to support this thesis. The first method, content analysis, is independent of the second method and determines the need to gain opinion of the best organic organizational structure to provide an IO capability to maneuver brigades. The second method is a cross-sectional survey that will ultimately answer the thesis question: What is the best organizational structure to provide maneuver brigades the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate IO into the brigade's tactical missions?

Part I: Content Analysis

Content analysis is a methodology used to study human behavior in an indirect way through forms of communication such as documents, articles, songs, speeches, etc. (Fraenkel and Norman 2000). Content analysis is often used in conjunction with other methods (Fraenkel and Norman 2000). This methodology was chosen to obtain descriptive information about IO as well as to determine if there are IO deficiencies at the

brigade level. In particular, qualitative or non-frequency analysis will be used to analyze documents.

Data Collection Plan (Content Analysis)

A random sample of AARs, articles, and FMs within the past ten years that relate to operations in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq will be chosen for analysis. Professional articles and FMs that do not discuss IO will be screened out for analysis. Articles and FMs that discuss IO will be retained for analysis. All obtained unit AARs from operations within the past ten years will be retained for analysis.

Analysis Plan (Content Analysis)

Documents that pass the screening criteria will be analyzed to provide answers to the following questions:

1. What is the role of IO on the battlefield and, in particular, what is the role of IO at the tactical level?

2. Is IO important in determining success at the operational and tactical level of war in the operational environment of today and the future?

3. Is there a need to improve IO at the brigade level?

4. How effective has the Army been in integrating IO into recent operations?

Qualitative and non-frequency analysis of the documents retained for analysis will be used to answer the four questions listed above. Qualitative analysis will provide a general description of IO's role in army operations and is expected to establish the need for further investigation to gain opinion about how to structure an organization at the brigade level that provides an IO capability to brigades. It is expected that unit AARs

from recent operations will discuss IO and the role IO played in those operations. These AAR comments are expected to be positive or negative and in many cases comments will be focused on IO at the brigade level.

Some AARs may not mention IO. If IO is not mentioned in an AAR, the assumption will be made the unit did not believe IO worthy of mentioning because there was no impact by IO in their operation. The lack of comment about IO in an AAR will be evaluated as a negative response assuming the unit did not realize or achieve the effects of IO as a combat multiplier in the operation.

Part II: Cross-Sectional Survey

Cross-Sectional survey is a type of survey that collects information from a sample drawn from a predetermined population at one point in time (Fraenkel and Norman 2000). This methodology was chosen because it is the best method to gain opinions from Army field grade officers (leaders who influence or implement Army doctrine) to add legitimacy to solution(s) for the thesis question.

Unit of Analysis (Cross-Sectional Survey)

The true population for this survey that could best answer the thesis question is determined to be all Army field grade officers. Since a survey of all Army field grade officers is not possible for this thesis, the true population had to be narrowed. The population determined to be most concerned with the topic of this thesis are Army field grade officers who fall into the branches or functional areas of armor (AR), infantry (IN), information operations (IO), civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP). To further narrow the population so the researcher could feasibly perform a survey, a

sample population is determined. The sample population will be a sample of convenience of Army field grade officers attending the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in class 2003/2004. The sample population is all Army field grade officers at CGSC in the branches or functional areas of AR, IN, IO, CA, and PSYOP. In total, 133 Army Officers will be surveyed.

Mode of Data Collection (Cross-Sectional Survey)

The survey will be provided to the sample population through email as a web-based survey. Survey participants will have two weeks to complete the survey. At the end of the two-week time period, the survey will be closed and the raw data will be compiled for analysis. The advantage to this mode of data collection is that it is inexpensive, can be accomplished by the researcher alone, provides access to hard to reach people and provides respondents with time for thoughtful response. The disadvantage to this mode of collection is that questions cannot be clarified and this type of survey typically has a low level of response compared to the number of people polled. The parameters of the web-based survey allow the respondent to access the survey to provide answers, withdraw from the survey having not completed it and then return to the survey to complete it from where they left off. The respondent can also access the survey during the two week time period to modify answers if necessary.

A minimum response rate of 30 percent is acceptable to perform analysis and to draw conclusions. The response rate is defined as the number of respondents who complete the survey/the total number of potential respondents in the sample population (133). A survey will be considered incomplete if no questions are answered beyond question number six on the survey.

Instrument (Cross-Sectional Survey)

The survey instrument will be made up primarily of closed-ended, multiple choice questions that answer this study's subordinate and primary questions. The first six questions on the survey will be used to describe the respondents of the survey and may be used to further compare responses by the five different categories (AR, IN, IO, CA, and PSYOP) of respondents. A minimal number of open-ended questions will be used in the survey to allow respondents to provide solutions of their own to the question of what is the best organizational structure to provide an IO capability at brigade level.

Analysis Plan (Cross-Sectional Survey)

When the two-week survey window is complete, the raw data from each survey will be captured and analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to calculate the mean and standard deviation for each survey question. Survey questions will be categorized and correlate to answer the questions concerning this thesis. The survey will aim to answer the following questions:

1. What is the best organic organizational structure to provide the maneuver brigade with the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate IO into the brigade's tactical missions?

2. How important is IO in achieving success at the tactical level?

3. How effective has the Army been in integrating IO into recent operations?

4. How effective is the Army in providing IO assistance from headquarters outside the brigade?

5. Does the brigade staff have the experience and level of knowledge necessary to support successful integration of IO into a brigade's operations?

6. Do brigades need a full time capability to plan, integrate and coordinate IO activities into the brigade's tactical missions?

Survey results will be categorized by respondents in total and by the five branches or functional areas of respondents in the sample population. This will be done to compare responses of the five different groups, but may have no value to answering the thesis question other than to provide insight into areas that may require further study concerning IO. Also, responses from open-ended questions will be categorized and provided in this study to either support questions of this study or provide insight into areas that may require further study.

Dual Methodology

Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the methodology that will lead to chapter four and five of this study. Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of where questions of this study will be answered in the methodology.



Figure 1. Methodology Diagram



Figure 2. Methodology vs. Research Questions Diagram

Internal Validity

The following are threats of design from internal validity and the means to control them:

Instrument Defects. The survey questions and analysis of the survey data could be manipulated to achieve desired results of the researcher's personal bias. The Development and Assessment Division (DAD) at the Army's CGSC will be utilized to ensure an objective survey. SPSS software program will be used to calculate data from the survey.

Low Response Rate. There is high probability that the survey methodology used in this study could result in a low number of respondents completing the survey that is critical to this study. A web based survey with as few questions as feasible will be used to minimize the amount of time required for each respondent to complete the survey. Respondents need only to log into the web site of the survey and answer questions, so there is no requirement for them to package and actively return their survey answers to the researcher. Respondents will also be given ample time of two weeks to complete the survey.

Flawed Sample Population. The sample population may not equal the true population for the survey-A sample of convenience is being used for this survey since a captive audience of knowledgeable field grade officers exists at CGSC. This was done because the researcher believed a higher response rate would occur with this sample population versus one that included field grade officers outside the school.

Research Focus. The research focus for this subject is on an organizational change to provide IO capability at the brigade level, and does not intend to address training and

equipment issues related to the subject. This is recognized as a limitation of the research and will be addressed in chapter five as an area that may require further study.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, data gathered through the methodologies of content analysis and cross-sectional survey are analyzed. Recommendations and conclusions will be made in chapter five.

Content Analysis of FMs, Articles, and AARs and Lessons Learned

Role and Description of IO

Four Army field manuals (FMs 3-0, 3-13, 3-90, and 3-90.3) were analyzed for a qualitative description of the role of IO in Army operations. FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 3-13, *IO: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, both describe IO and its role in Army operations. To understand IO, the definition and description of information superiority must first be understood. "Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same" (FM 3-0, 2001). Three contributors enable commander's to achieve information superiority: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), information management (IM) and information operations (IO). The three contributors to information superiority are interdependent of one another. Figure 3 shows the elements that go into ensuring information superiority.



Figure 3. Elements of Information Superiority

Source: FM 3-0*: Operations,* 2001, 11-6.

IO is only one of the contributors to achieving information superiority, but is integral in affecting the perceptions of the enemy and attitudes that exist in an area of operation (AO) and the information environment. FM 3-13 defines IO as the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.

IO can be broken down into the two subordinate categories of offensive IO and defensive IO. “Offensive IO destroys, degrades, disrupts, denies, deceives, exploits, and influences adversary decision makers and others who can affect the success of friendly

operations. Offensive IO also targets the information and information systems (INFOSYS) used in adversary decision-making processes (FM 3-13, 2003).” “Defensive IO protects and defends friendly information, C2 systems, and INFOSYS (FM 3-13, 2003).”

According to FM 3-13, IO is made up of the following core elements, supporting elements and related activities (see glossary for definitions):

1. Core Elements: operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MD), electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO). Computer network operations comprise computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and related computer network exploitation (CNE).

2. Supporting Elements: Physical destruction, IA, physical security, counterintelligence, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda.

3. Related Activities: Public affairs (PA) and civil military operations (CMO) Military deception.

Coordinating Staff Responsibility

FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, places the responsibility for coordinating related IO elements and related activities with the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS), G-7 at the Corps and Division levels of command. An S-7 is recognized to fulfill this function in selected brigades only. The majority of armored and infantry brigades in the US Army are not supported by doctrine to have an S-7.

Doctrinal Support for IO at the Brigade Level

Three field manuals (FM 3-13, FM 3-90 and FM 3-90.3) were analyzed and expected to provide doctrinal support for the coordination, integration, and planning of the elements of IO and its related activities at the tactical or brigade level. FM 3-90, *Tactics*, provides no support or doctrinal implementation of IO at the tactical or brigade level. FM 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team,* has two pages that provide a general description of CA, PSYOP, and PA at the brigade level. While one is a core element and two are related activities in IO, the manual in no way begins to support the implementation of IO at the brigade level in tactical missions.

The FM 3-13 provides a table that depicts the IO elements and related activities and the echelons of command that are responsible. Table 1 places responsibility at the brigade level for carrying out many IO activities.

Table 1. IO Responsibilities by Echelon

	ASCC	Corps	Div	Bde	ASCC	Corps	Div	Bde	ASCC	Corps	Div	Bde
OPSEC	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4
PSYOP	P E	P E A	P E A	P 1, 2/ E A 4	P E	P E A	P E A	P 1, 2/ E A 4	P E	P E A	P E A	P 1, 2/ E A 4
Military Deception	P E	P E	P E A	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	E 4	X	X	X	X
EW–EA	P E	P E	P E	E A 4	P E	P E	P E	E A 4	X	X	X	X
EW–ES	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	E 4	P E	E	E	E 4
EW–EP	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4
CNO	P	P	X	X	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CNA	P	P	X	X	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CND	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	E 4	P E	P E	P E	E 4
CNE	P	P	X	X	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Physical Destruction	P	P E	P E	P E 4	P	P E	P E	P E 4	X	X	X	X
IA	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4
Physical Security	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	P E 4
Counterintelligence	P E	P E	P E	P E A 1 2	P E	P E	P E	E A 4	P E	P E	P E	E A 4
Counterdeception	P E	P E	P E	P E 1 2	P E	P E	E	E 4	P E	P E	E	E 4
Counterpropaganda	P E	P E	P E	P E 4	P E	P E	P E	E 4	P E	P E	E	EA 4
Related Activity												
CMO	P E	P E	P E	P E A 4	P E	P E	P E	P E A 4	P E	P E	P E	P E A
Public Affairs	P E	P E	P E	E A 4	P E	P E	P E	E A 4	P E	P E	P E	E A 4

P – Plan/prepare element, objectives, and tasks as stated in OPLAN/OPORD
E – Execute the objective and task as stated in OPLAN/OPORD
X – Command is not involved with this element
A – Accomplished with attached assets

1 – Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCT)
2 – Enhanced Army National Guard brigades
3 – Divisional maneuver brigades
4 – All brigades

Source: FM 3-13: *IO: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (2003), 1-15.

Practical Application of IO

Eight AARs from units at brigade through the corps level of command were analyzed to determine: (1) the importance of IO in achieving success at the operational and tactical level, (2) the need to improve IO at the brigade level, and (3) Tthe Army's effectiveness in integrating IO into operations. These AARs came from units that participated in OIF and OEF.

Two of the AARs contained no mention of IO. The other six AARs addressed IO and generally recognized IO as being important to achieving success. Three of the AARs directly supported the need for an IO officer or capability at the brigade level to integrate IO into the brigade's missions. Generally, AARs recognize the effects that can be

achieved through IO, but indicate that IO was not effectively integrated into the unit's operations. More specifically for OIF, comments suggest that prior to attacking into Iraq, the elements of IO were not integrated or coordinated very well below the corps level.

Cross-Sectional Survey Analysis

A link to the web-based survey used to support research for this thesis was sent by email requesting 133 Army field grade officers attending CGSC to complete the survey. These officers fit the profile for the sample population for the survey and belong to one of five categories (branch or functional area): infantry, armor, information operations, civil affairs, or psychological operations. Out of the 133 people in the sample population, 54 supplied responses to the survey. One survey did not meet the criteria to be counted as a complete survey, so the data for 53 completed surveys was calculated. The desired response rate for this survey was 30 percent and a response rate of 39 percent was achieved.

A copy of the survey as presented to the sample population is located in Appendix A. The survey with raw number of responses to each question is in Appendix B. The descriptive statistics calculated using software program from SPSS are in Appendixes D through I. Short answers to questions 21 and 22 are located in Appendixes J and K. The Likert scale applied to questions in the survey is in Appendix C. Not every question required the Likert scale to be applied.

Description of Respondents to the Survey

The first six questions in the survey provided a description of the respondents. Descriptive statistics were calculated for each of the five categories of respondents to allow comparison of to occur if desired.

In general, the majority of respondents belonged to infantry, followed by armor, IO, PSYOP, and CA. Almost 70 percent of the respondents have deployed for an operation within the past ten years and approximately 1/3 of the respondents participated in OIF or OEF. The majority of respondents were assigned or attached to a brigade staff at some time and approximately 30 percent of them were assigned or attached to a brigade staff during an operational deployment. Forty respondents dealt with IO in some capacity of leadership as a commander or staff officer. Only one respondent has been formally trained to meet FA 30 qualification standard for IO. All other respondents have either received school training or on the job training with IO.

Analysis of Responses to Survey Questions

Recognition of weaknesses to this type of survey were discussed in chapter three of this thesis. Despite survey weaknesses and the potential that the sample population does not equal the true population, survey results generally reflect the same information discovered in analysis of AARs and lessons learned about IO. The survey results are supported by the AARs, lessons learned, and articles used in this study.

Respondents believe IO is important in achieving success at the operational and tactical level with IO being slightly more important at the operational level. Respondents also believe that IO will be slightly more important in achieving success in the future. Respondents indicate that a brigade's ability to plan and integrate IO activities determines

the level of success achieved by that brigade. Respondents indicate that it is important for a brigade to have the ability to plan and integrate IO activities, but that brigades currently probably do not have the qualified assigned personnel to perform those functions. Respondents believe that in the future, a qualified staff member should be assigned to the brigade staff to plan and integrate IO activities. Respondents lean more towards providing an assigned, trained IO officer to the brigade staff who is under control of the brigade S3 more than assigning another coordinating staff section (S-7) to the brigade. Most of the respondents have not experienced augmentation to their unit or staff in the area of IO, but the ones that have claim that the quality of assistance was somewhat effective. Reasons to why the assistance was only somewhat effective are in Appendix K.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was designed to determine the best organic organizational structure to provide the maneuver brigade with the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate IO into the brigade's tactical missions. The data provided through analysis of written documents and the respondents of the cross-sectional survey support the conclusions to the following eight questions from Chapter three:

1. According to published documents what is the role of IO on the battlefield and, in particular, what is the role of IO at the tactical level?

The role of IO as described in FM 3-13 is to affect the perceptions of the enemy and attitudes that exist in an area of operation (AO) and the information environment. Obviously, IO is meant to influence those perceptions and attitudes in such a way to enable a unit to achieve success. Understanding the role of IO helps gain an appreciation for what IO can accomplish at the brigade level.

2. According to published documents and leader's opinions, how important is IO in determining operational success in the operational environment of today and the future?

Through content analysis and the survey, overwhelming evidence exists that IO is important in achieving success in today's operational environment. More importantly, since this study looks to a change that would occur in the future, respondents to the survey believe that IO will be slightly more important in achieving success in the future.

3. According to published documents, is there a need to improve IO at the brigade level?

The answer to question three determined that IO to be important in achieving success, so the next step was to answer the question about the relevancy of IO at the brigade level. AARs and lessons learned from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan support the need to improve IO at the brigade level. Evidence exists from content analysis and the survey that as the Army transforms, an IO capability becomes more critical to brigades.

4. According to leader's opinions, how important is IO in achieving success at the tactical level?

This study sought to not only determine if IO was important to the brigade, but also determine the level of importance that IO brought to achieving success at the tactical leve. Analysis from the survey concludes that IO is important in achieving success at the tactical level and that efforts should be made to provide trained IO personnel at the brigade level.

5. According to published documents and leader's opinions, how effective has the Army been in integrating IO into recent operations?

Since the study determined that IO was important at the brigade level, this study sought to determine how successful the Army has been in recent operations in integrating IO. From content analysis and survey, evidence suggests that the Army has only been somewhat effective in integrating IO into recent operations. It appears that the Army has had success in implementing elements and activities of IO during operations at particular times, but not successful in implementing IO in its entirety all the time from the highest echelon of command through the lowest. More specifically, analysis of AARs and lessons learned shows that the lower the echelon, the less likely IO will be integrated. This

directly corresponds with the location of trained IO personnel assigned or attached to staffs.

6. According to leader's opinions, how effective is the Army in providing IO assistance from headquarters outside the brigade?

Answering this question directly relates to the need to have trained IO personnel at the brigade level. Analysis of survey responses shows that the army has been somewhat effective in providing IO assistance from headquarters outside the brigade. However, units were not able to either integrate IO quickly into operations or attain the full potential of IO effects when augmentation from outside the brigade occurred. The answer to this question leads the researcher to believe that the current procedure of augmenting a staff with personnel from outside the brigade is a flawed concept that is in need of improvement.

7. According to leader's opinions, does the brigade staff have the experience and level of knowledge necessary to support successful integration of IO into a brigade's operations?

Since research from this study has shown that IO is important at the tactical level and that the current procedure for ensuring IO at the tactical level is flawed, the next logical step is to determine if personnel currently assigned to the brigade staff are knowledgeable enough to plan and execute IO. Analysis from the survey indicates that brigade staffs do not have the experience and level of knowledge necessary to support successful integration of IO into the brigade's operations. Comments made on the survey and in numerous AARs suggest that the Army does not have a common understanding of the role of IO and the elements and activities associated with IO.

8. According to leader's opinions, do brigades need a full time capability to plan, integrate and coordinate IO activities into the brigade's tactical missions?

Based on this research showing that IO is important at the tactical level and that brigades do not have the knowledgeable assigned personnel for IO, it is important to gain opinion about whether or not there is a necessary requirement for brigades to have a built in capability to plan, integrate and coordinate IO activities. Analysis from the survey shows that brigades do need a full time capability to plan, integrate and coordinate IO activities for the brigade's missions. IO is recognized as being important in doctrine and opinion to achieve success at the tactical level, however Army doctrine does not support the assignment of a trained IO person at the brigade.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the findings of this study:

1. Based on supporting evidence from content analysis and a cross-sectional survey, a formally trained IO person should be assigned to the brigade staff for planning, coordination and integrating IO activities in the brigade's operations. Opinion from the survey suggests breaking from Army doctrine at the brigade level by having an assigned person who is organized and under control of the brigade S-3. This trained IO person would function under the S3 similarly to how a brigade fire support officer functions in that he or she would be responsible for planning and overseeing all of the IO assets available to a brigade.

2. More training needs to occur to ensure common understanding in the Army about IO and its activities in relation to operations. At the tactical level, a void exists about the effects that can be achieved to ensure success in a brigade's operations.

3. Doctrinal manuals need to be revised to fix the doctrinal disconnects that currently exist. FM 3-13 and FM 3-0 discuss the importance of IO in achieving information superiority in the current operational environment. FM 3-13 goes as far as listing the responsibilities of brigades in IO, but the manual that supports the mounted brigade combat team has little to no description of IO at the brigade level.

Recommendations for Future Study

While numerous articles, AARs, and FMs were available to assist in researching this topic, almost none of them addressed IO at the brigade level or below. Because of this, more research should be conducted to determine how IO effects a brigade's operations. The following areas are recommended for further research in this area:

1. Study the equipment requirement that brigades will need in order to effectively integrate IO. This should include research of how to attain "reach back" capability and nesting with an operations overall IO campaign.

2. Analyze units that have created ad hoc organizations in OIF and OEF to meet the brigade's need for an IO coordinator or staff.

3. Based on a specific assigned IO organizational structure at brigade, analyze and determine which elements and activities of IO that the brigade can assume responsibility for without assistance from a higher headquarters.

GLOSSARY

Brigade. The words brigade or maneuver brigade as used in this thesis refers to armored and infantry brigades as well as armored cavalry regiments.

Information Environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information.

Maximum. For descriptive statistics, maximum assigned Likert scale number answered to a particular question in the survey.

Mean. For descriptive statistics, a number having an inermediate value between several other numbers in a group from which it was derived and of which it expressed the average value. It is the simple average formed by adding the numbers together and dividing by the number of numbers in the group.

Minimum. For descriptive statistics, minimum assigned Likert scale number answered to a particular question in the survey.

Standard Deviation. For descriptive statistics, a measure of the deviation of individual numbers from the mean of the group of numbers. It is the mean or average deviation of those numbers from the mean of the set of numbers.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY WITH COVER LETTER

This survey was provided in a web-based format. The survey link was emailed to each of the respondents and the respondents were given two weeks to answer.

Information Operations in Tactical Units

I. Introduction and Instructions

This survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. The first six questions are to be used as background information to generally describe the respondents of the survey.

This survey is used to partially complete a thesis for a Master of Military Art and Science at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Individual responses on this survey form are anonymous; comments on this form may be used in the research with your approval.

The purpose of this research is to review information operations (IO) capability in tactical units.

Aggregate results of this survey are used in statistical analysis to form broad conclusions and recommendations.

When referring to "brigade" or "maneuver brigade", do not consider STRYKER Brigades or 3ID structure change.

Thank you for your time and participation.

II. Survey Questions:

1. Which of the following describes your basic branch or functional area?

a. Infantry
b. Armor
c. Information Operations (FA 30)
d. Psychological Operations (FA 39)
e. Civil Affairs (FA 39)

Survey Control
04-017
CGSC - DAD

2. Check the operations on which you have deployed.

a. Operation Restore Hope (Somalia)
b. Operation Joint Guard (Bosnia IFOR/SFOR)
c. Operation Joint Guardian (Kosovo)
d. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
e. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
f. Other within the past 10 years

3. Were you assigned or attached to an armored or infantry brigade staff for any of the operations listed in question 2?

a. Yes
b. No

4. Have you ever been assigned or attached to an armored or infantry brigade staff?

a. Yes
b. No

5. What level of leadership have you had in dealing with information operations (IO)? You may check more than one answer.

a. Commander
b. Staff Officer, above brigade level
c. Staff Officer, brigade level
d. Staff Officer, battalion level
e. Other
f. None

6. What is your experience/training with information operations? You may check more than one answer.

a. Formally trained by the Army for FA 30
b. Introduced to IO in an Army School/Course
c. On-the-job training

7. In today's operational environment, how important are information operations in achieving success at the operational level?

a. Very Important
b. Important
c. Undecided
d. Little Importance

e. Not Important

8. In today's operational environment, how important are information operations in achieving success at the tactical level?

a. Very Important
b. Important
c. Undecided
d. Little Importance
e. Not Important

9. Fill in the Blank: "In the future, information operations will be _____ in achieving success than they are now."

a. More Important
b. Equally Important
c. Less Important

10. How important are information operations in winning tactical battles and engagements?

a. Very Important
b. Important
c. Undecided
d. Little Importance
e. Not Important

11. How well do you agree with the following statement: "A brigade's ability to plan IO activities in an operation determines the level of success achieved."

a. Strongly Agree
b. Agree
c. Undecided
d. Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

12. How well do you agree with the following statement: "A brigade's ability to integrate IO activities in an operation determines the level of success achieved."

a. Strongly Agree
b. Agree
c. Undecided
d. Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

13. How important is it for a maneuver brigade to be able to plan IO in full spectrum

operations?

a. Very Important
b. Important
c. Undecided
d. Little Importance
e. Not Important

14. How important is it for a maneuver brigade to be able to integrate IO activities in full spectrum operations?

a. Very Important
b. Important
c. Undecided
d. Little Importance
e. Not Important

15. How well do you agree with the following statement: "The maneuver brigade staff has qualified assigned personnel to plan IO activities."

a. Strongly Agree
b. Agree
c. Undecided
d. Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

16. How well do you agree with the following statement: "The maneuver brigade staff has the qualified assigned personnel to integrate IO activities."

a. Strongly Agree
b. Agree
c. Undecided
d. Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

17. In the future Army, should the maneuver brigade staff have an assigned staff member that is qualified both to plan and integrate IO activities?

a. Yes
b. No
c. Undecided

18. If an IO staff function is assigned to a maneuver brigade staff, which of the following

best ensures planning, coordination, and integration of IO into the brigade's missions or operations?

a. S7 (IO) - Separate coordinating staff section
b. Trained FA 30 (IO) staff member who is under control of the brigade S3
c. Additional training in IO for the brigade S3
d. Other (please specify)

19. Have you experienced augmentation to your unit/staff by trained IO personnel? If the answer is no, go to question 22.

a. Yes
b. No

20. If augmented by trained IO personnel, how would you characterize the quality of their assistance?

a. Effective
b. Somewhat Effective
c. Somewhat Ineffective
d. Ineffective

21. List your reason(s) for your previous response.

22. List the top two things you would do to improve IO capability for the maneuver brigade.

III. Completion.

You have completed the survey. Thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY WITH RAW ANSWERS

The survey questions with raw answers are provided in this appendix. The total number of respondents for each question, raw answers and number of respondents who skipped questions are in bold. Fifty four respondents began the survey, but only 53 surveys were calculated because one survey did not meet the criteria for analysis. The response rate for this survey was 39.8 percent (53 completed surveys/133 potential respondents).

Survey Questions with raw answers:

1. Which of the following describes your basic branch or functional area?

(27) a. Infantry
(19) b. Armor
(3) c. Information Operations (FA 30)
(4) d. Psychological Operations (FA 39)
(1) e. Civil Affairs (FA 39)
(0) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

2. Check the operations on which you have deployed.

(0) a. Operation Restore Hope (Somalia)
(16) b. Operation Joint Guard (Bosnia IFOR/SFOR)
(13) c. Operation Joint Guardian (Kosovo)
(9) d. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
(8) e. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
(32) f. Other within the past 10 years
(4) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 50

3. Were you assigned or attached to an armored or infantry brigade staff for any of the operations listed in question 2?

(17) a. Yes
(36) b. No
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

4. Have you ever been assigned or attached to an armored or infantry brigade staff?

(36) a. Yes
(16) b. No
(2) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 52

5. What level of leadership have you had in dealing with information operations (IO)? You may check more than one answer.

(19) a. Commander
(15) b. Staff Officer, above brigade level
(14) c. Staff Officer, brigade level
(17) d. Staff Officer, battalion level
(8) e. Other
(12) f. None
(2) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 52

6. What is your experience/training with information operations? You may check more than one answer.

(1) a. Formally trained by the Army for FA 30
(34) b. Introduced to IO in an Army School/Course
(35) c. On-the-job training
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

7. In today's operational environment, how important are information operations in

achieving success at the operational level?

(31) a. Very Important
(17) b. Important
(5) c. Undecided
(0) d. Little Importance
(0) e. Not Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

8. In today's operational environment, how important are information operations in achieving success at the tactical level?

(20) a. Very Important
(24) b. Important
(8) c. Undecided
(1) d. Little Importance
(0) e. Not Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

9. Fill in the Blank: "In the future, information operations will be _____ in achieving success than they are now."

(30) a. More Important
(21) b. Equally Important
(2) c. Less Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

10. How important are information operations in winning tactical battles and engagements?

(6) a. Very Important
(32) b. Important
(9) c. Undecided
(4) d. Little Importance
(2) e. Not Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53
11. How well do you agree with the following statement: "A brigade's ability to plan IO

activities in an operation determines the level of success achieved."

(4) a. Strongly Agree
(25) b. Agree
(15) c. Undecided
(8) d. Disagree
(1) e. Strongly Disagree
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

12. How well do you agree with the following statement: "A brigade's ability to integrate IO activities in an operation determines the level of success achieved."

(8) a. Strongly Agree
(31) b. Agree
(12) c. Undecided
(2) d. Disagree
(0) e. Strongly Disagree
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

13. How important is it for a maneuver brigade to be able to plan IO in full spectrum operations?

(15) a. Very Important
(32) b. Important
(3) c. Undecided
(3) d. Little Importance
(0) e. Not Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

14. How important is it for a maneuver brigade to be able to integrate IO activities in full

spectrum operations?

(19) a. Very Important
(30) b. Important
(1) c. Undecided
(3) d. Little Importance
(0) e. Not Important
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

15. How well do you agree with the following statement: "The maneuver brigade staff has qualified assigned personnel to plan IO activities."

(1) a. Strongly Agree
(7) b. Agree
(8) c. Undecided
(27) d. Disagree
(10) e. Strongly Disagree
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

16. How well do you agree with the following statement: "The maneuver brigade staff has the qualified assigned personnel to integrate IO activities."

(1) a. Strongly Agree
(10) b. Agree
(8) c. Undecided
(25) d. Disagree
(9) e. Strongly Disagree
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

17. In the future Army, should the maneuver brigade staff have an assigned staff member that is qualified both to plan and integrate IO activities?

(47) a. Yes
(4) b. No
(2) c. Undecided
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

18. If an IO staff function is assigned to a maneuver brigade staff, which of the following

best ensures planning, coordination, and integration of IO into the brigade's missions or operations?

(16) a. S7 (IO) - Separate coordinating staff section
(32) b. Trained FA 30 (IO) staff member who is under control of the brigade S3
(4) c. Additional training in IO for the brigade S3
(1) d. Other (please specify)
- "Can't say- never on BDE staff"
(1) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 53

19. Have you experienced augmentation to your unit/staff by trained IO personnel? If the answer is no, go to question 22.

(14) a. Yes
(36) b. No
(4) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 50

20. If augmented by trained IO personnel, how would you characterize the quality of their assistance?

(4) a. Effective
(11) b. Somewhat Effective
(2) c. Somewhat Ineffective
(0) d. Ineffective
(17) Skipped Question

TOTAL Respondents: 37

NOTE: Only 14 people should have responded to this question.

21. List your reason(s) for your previous response.

TOTAL Respondents: 12

See Appendix J for responses.

22. List the top two things you would do to improve IO capability for the maneuver

brigade.

TOTAL Respondents: 43

See Appendix I for responses.

APPENDIX C

LIKERT SCALE APPLED TO THE SURVEY

To gain meaning from the survey results, a Likert Scale was applied to the survey answers. This scale was used to calculate the descriptive statistics in appendixes D through I. Table 2 provides the survey questions, answers, and the scale applied to each answer.

Table 2. Likert Scale Applied to the Survey

Likert Scale Applied to Survey Answers		
Question(s) Associated with Answer	**Answer**	**Scale**
3, 4, 19	Yes	1
	No	2
7, 8, 10, 13, 14,	Very Important	1
	Important	2
	Undecided	3
	Little Importance	4
	Not Important	5
11,12, 15, 16,	Strongly Agree	1
	Agree	2
	Undecided	3
	Disagree	4
	Strongly Disagree	5
9	More Important	1
	Equally Important	2
	Less Important	3
17	Yes	1
	No	2
	Undecided	3
18	S7 (IO) Separate Coordinating Staff	4
	Trained FA 30 staff member under BDE S3 Control	3
	Additional Training in IO for BDE S3	2
	Other	1
20	Effective	1
	Somewhat Effective	2
	Somewhat Ineffective	3
	Ineffective	4

APPENDIX D

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE

Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the survey in total. Questions 21 and 22 are in Appendix J and I respectively, so they are not reflected in this table. Minimum, maximum, sum, mean and standard deviation for all tables in appendixes C thru H were calculated using the SPCC software provided by the Army's Development and Assessment Division at CGSC. Descriptive statistics for each of the five basic branches or functional areas surveyed are available for comparison in Appendixes D through H. In total, 54 respondents started the survey. One survey was not complete and category or branch of one respondent failed to be entered in the data analyzed for question one, so the descriptive statistics below appears to include only 52 of the respondents, but 53 respondents met the criteria to be considered as a completed survey. All other questions have the appropriate number of respondents beyond the respondent descriptive questions numbered one through six.

Table 3. Information Operations Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	52	2	5	223	4.29	.893
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	16	1.00	1.00	16.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Joint Guardian	13	1.00	1.00	13.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Enduring Freedom	10	1.00	1.00	10.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Iraqi Freedom	6	1.00	1.00	6.00	1.0000	.00000
Other	32	1.00	1.00	32.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 3	52	1.00	2.00	88.00	1.6923	.46604

Information Operations Descriptive Statistics cont'd						
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Question 4	52	1.00	2.00	68.00	1.3077	.46604
Question 5a	19	1.00	1.00	19.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5b	14	1.00	1.00	14.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5c	15	1.00	1.00	15.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5d	17	1.00	1.00	17.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5e	8	1.00	1.00	8.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5f	12	1.00	1.00	12.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6a	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 6b	34	1.00	1.00	34.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6c	35	1.00	1.00	35.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 7	53	1.00	3.00	80.00	1.5094	.66860
Question 8	53	1.00	4.00	95.00	1.7925	.76858
Question 9	53	1.00	3.00	78.00	1.4717	.57525
Question 10	53	1.00	5.00	122.00	2.3019	.88979
Question 11	53	1.00	5.00	134.00	2.5283	.89020
Question 12	53	1.00	4.00	114.00	2.1509	.71780
Question 13	53	1.00	4.00	100.00	1.8868	.75091
Question 14	53	1.00	4.00	94.00	1.7736	.75042
Question 15	53	1.00	5.00	197.00	3.7170	.98795
Question 16	53	1.00	5.00	190.00	3.5849	1.04576
Question 17	53	1.00	3.00	61.00	1.1509	.45557
Question 18	53	1.00	4.00	178.00	3.3585	.70967
Question 19	50	1.00	2.00	87.00	1.7400	.44309
Question 20	13	1	3	25	1.92	.641

APPENDIX E

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE (INFANTRY)

Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for 26 of the 27 field grade officers in the infantry branch who participated in the survey. One survey was not completed and it came from this category of respondents, so the information was not calculated.

Table 4. IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (IN)

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (Infantry)						
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	26	5	5	130	5.00	.000
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	7	1.00	1.00	7.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Joint Guardian	9	1.00	1.00	9.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Enduring Freedom	5	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Iraqi Freedom	3	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.0000	.00000
Other	16	1.00	1.00	16.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 3	26	1.00	2.00	46.00	1.7692	.42967
Question 4	26	1.00	2.00	35.00	1.3462	.48516
Question 5a	13	1.00	1.00	13.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5b	8	1.00	1.00	8.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5c	9	1.00	1.00	9.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5d	12	1.00	1.00	12.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5e	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5f	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6a	0					
Question 6b	17	1.00	1.00	17.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6c	19	1.00	1.00	19.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 7	26	1.00	3.00	38.00	1.4615	.64689
Question 8	26	1.00	4.00	45.00	1.7308	.87442
Question 9	26	1.00	2.00	39.00	1.5000	.50990
IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (Infantry) cont'd						

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Question 10	26	1.00	5.00	63.00	2.4231	1.06482
Question 11	26	1.00	4.00	66.00	2.5385	.98917
Question 12	26	1.00	3.00	52.00	2.0000	.56569
Question 13	26	1.00	4.00	46.00	1.7692	.71036
Question 14	26	1.00	2.00	43.00	1.6538	.48516
Question 15	26	2.00	5.00	96.00	3.6923	1.04954
Question 16	26	2.00	5.00	92.00	3.5385	1.13950
Question 17	26	1.00	2.00	29.00	1.1154	.32581
Question 18	26	2.00	4.00	92.00	3.5385	.58177
Question 19	25	1.00	2.00	43.00	1.7200	.45826
Question 20	7	1	3	13	1.86	.690

APPENDIX F

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE (ARMOR)

Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for the 19 field grade officers in the armor branch who participated in the survey.

Table 5. IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (Armor)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	19	4	4	76	4.00	.000
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	5	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Joint Guardian	3	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Enduring Freedom	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Iraqi Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Other	12	1.00	1.00	12.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 3	18	1.00	2.00	27.00	1.5000	.51450
Question 4	18	1.00	2.00	24.00	1.3333	.48507
Question 5a	6	1.00	1.00	6.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5b	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5c	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5d	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5e	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 5f	8	1.00	1.00	8.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6a	0					
Question 6b	11	1.00	1.00	11.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6c	11	1.00	1.00	11.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 7	19	1.00	3.00	33.00	1.7368	.73349
Question 8	19	1.00	3.00	39.00	2.0526	.62126
Question 9	19	1.00	3.00	26.00	1.3684	.68399
Question 10	19	1.00	4.00	43.00	2.2632	.73349
Question 11	19	1.00	5.00	50.00	2.6316	.89508
Question 12	19	1.00	4.00	47.00	2.4737	.84119

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (Armor) cont'd						
	N	**Minimum**	**Maximum**	**Sum**	**Mean**	**Std. Deviation**
Question 13	19	1.00	4.00	39.00	2.0526	.84811
Question 14	19	1.00	4.00	38.00	2.0000	1.00000
Question 15	19	2.00	5.00	70.00	3.6842	.82007
Question 16	19	2.00	5.00	68.00	3.5789	.90159
Question 17	19	1.00	3.00	22.00	1.1579	.50146
Question 18	19	1.00	4.00	60.00	3.1579	.76472
Question 19	18	1.00	2.00	33.00	1.8333	.38348
Question 20	3	2	2	6	2.00	.000

APPENDIX G

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE (IO)

Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the three field grade officers in the IO functional area who participated in the survey.

Table 6. IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (IO)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	3	3	3	9	3.00	.000
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Joint Guardian	0					
Operation Enduring Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Operation Iraqi Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Other	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 3	3	2.00	2.00	6.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 4	3	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5a	0					
Question 5b	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5c	0					
Question 5d	0					
Question 5e	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5f	0					
Question 6a	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 6b	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 6c	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 7	3	1.00	2.00	4.00	1.3333	.57735
Question 8	3	2.00	2.00	6.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 9	3	2.00	2.00	6.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 10	3	2.00	3.00	7.00	2.3333	.57735
Question 11	3	2.00	3.00	7.00	2.3333	.57735
Question 12	3	2.00	3.00	7.00	2.3333	.57735

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (IO) cont'd						
	N	**Minimum**	**Maximum**	**Sum**	**Mean**	**Std. Deviation**
Question 13	3	1.00	3.00	6.00	2.0000	1.00000
Question 14	3	1.00	3.00	6.00	2.0000	1.00000
Question 15	3	4.00	5.00	14.00	4.6667	.57735
Question 16	3	4.00	5.00	13.00	4.3333	.57735
Question 17	3	1.00	3.00	5.00	1.6667	1.15470
Question 18	3	2.00	4.00	9.00	3.0000	1.00000
Question 19	2	2.00	2.00	4.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 20	0					

APPENDIX H

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE (CA)

Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics for the one field grade officer in the CA functional area who participated in the survey.

Table 7. IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (CA)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	0					
Operation Joint Guardian	0					
Operation Enduring Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Operation Iraqi Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Other	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 3	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.
Question 4	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.
Question 5a	0					
Question 5b	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 5c	0					
Question 5d	0					
Question 5e	0					
Question 5f	0					
Question 6a	0					
Question 6b	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 6c	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 7	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 8	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 9	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 10	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 11	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.
Question 12	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (CA) cont'd						
	N	**Minimum**	**Maximum**	**Sum**	**Mean**	**Std. Deviation**
Question 13	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	
Question 14	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	
Question 15	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 16	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 17	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 18	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.
Question 19	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 20	1	3	3	3	3.00	.

APPENDIX I

SPCC ANALYSIS TABLE (PSYOP)

Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the four field grade officers in the PSYOP functional area who participated in the survey.

Table 8. IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (PSYOP)

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (PSYOP)						
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Branch	4	2	2	8	2.00	.000
Operation Restore Hope	0					
Operation Joint Guard	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Operation Joint Guardian	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Operation Enduring Freedom	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Operation Iraqi Freedom	0					
Other	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 3	4	1.00	2.00	7.00	1.7500	.50000
Question 4	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5a	0					
Question 5b	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 5c	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5d	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.
Question 5e	3	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 5f	0					
Question 6a	0					
Question 6b	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 6c	2	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 7	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 8	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 9	4	1.00	2.00	6.00	1.5000	.57735
Question 10	4	2.00	2.00	8.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 11	4	2.00	3.00	9.00	2.2500	.50000
Question 12	4	1.00	2.00	6.00	1.5000	.57735

IO Survey Descriptive Statistics (PSYOP) cont'd						
	N	**Minimum**	**Maximum**	**Sum**	**Mean**	**Std. Deviation**
Question 13	4	2.00	2.00	8.00	2.0000	.00000
Question 14	4	1.00	2.00	6.00	1.5000	.57735
Question 15	4	4.00	4.00	16.00	4.0000	.00000
Question 16	4	4.00	4.00	16.00	4.0000	.00000
Question 17	4	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.0000	.00000
Question 18	4	3.00	4.00	15.00	3.7500	.50000
Question 19	4	1.00	2.00	6.00	1.5000	.57735
Question 20	2	1	2	3	1.50	.707

APPENDIX J

RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION 22

Question 22 of the survey asked respondents to provide two suggestions to improve the IO capability at the brigade level. Forty-three people provided a total of 76 suggestions to improve IO at the brigade level. The responses generally fell into four categories concerning organization modification, training and doctrine, equipment, and other comments. The comments and their categorization are listed in this appendix verbatim.

Organization Modification

1. Maneuver brigades do not have the physical assets to condcut IO. While IO will be a decisive factor in battles and engagements, BCTs currently can not directly plan or impliment IO. So . . . the two things would be to te resource them with planning staff AND resources (IEW assets for example).

2. Add qualified personnel.

3. Add an IO trained officer to the staff.

4. I would not assign it to the Bde S-3. While IO is very important, the Bde S-3 already has many responsibilities. I would create a S-7 position that is filled by a school trained IO officer.

5. Get IO functional area personnel assigned at BDE level.

6. Qualified personnel to conduct IO operations (does not necessarily have to be a FA30, but someone knowledgeable in IO).

7. Authorize an IO slot Fill the slot with a trained IO guy.

8. Add trained staff members to work under Bde S3.

9. Provide capability to integrate at Battalion level through training for existing positions or adding trained personnel to the organization.

10. Place a trained individual in the position.

11. Proper resourcing of IO trained personnel to BN level. Perhaps one trained soldier assigned to the BN S-3 shop.

12. Training and assignment of a qualified officer

13. Fully integrate a primary IO staff position within all BDE's.

14. Imbed a FA30 into BN level staffs to assist with the integration of IO throughout the BDE.

15. Have qualified personnel (Off/NCO) on the brigade staff (within the 3-Shop); not just one or two. Recommend (1) MAJ as OIC; (3) CPTs; (1) MSG; (5) SFC/SSG.

16. Assign officers.

17. Add it to the staff and fully man it with both equip and personnel.

18. IO Trained Staff member on staff Force implementation of IO Ops.

19. Dedicated staff section with school-trained IO personnel.

20. Assign an IO Primary Staff Officer.

21. Assign the appropriately trained and resourced personnel to the Brigade, ie UA, force structure.

22. Resource and develop new systems, capabilities, and authority to empower a Brigade as it moves forth as a UA

23. Assign an FA 30 officer to the staff Ensure IO is an integral component of all collective training at TF and higher levels.

24. Assign IO personnel to the BDE staff.

25. Get them a FA 30 qualified senior captain.

26. Creation of a dedicated IO staff section with a real voice.

27. Trained and qualified personnel assigned to all brigades as subordinate staff element to Bde 3 but with full autonomy and authority.

28. Provide the commander with a trained IO planner/integrator.

29. Give them a dedicated IO officer.

Training and Doctrine

1. IO responsibilities need to be assigned, in doctrine, to staff sections and then trained in CTCs and such. IO is like fire support or logisitcs - it comes in many forms and has many requirements.

2. Stop trying to make it so damned complex at the brigade level. Develop simple TTPs that brigades can execute. From there time and experience will evolve these to more complex and use tools. Sort of like tackling drills - start simple and go forward.

3. Trained personnel SME I\O.

4. Increased training Requirement to use IO in CTC rotations not just MRXs.

5. Make sure every staff member understands IO.

6. Train more with PAO,CA,PSYOP.

7. Develop the capability integrate IO into training.

8. An understanding of IO and how to use (better education process for officers/NCOs whether a FA30 or not).

9. Provide mobile training teams to train maneuver commanders and staff to understand the basic tenets of IO and the importance of early integration of IO into all planning.

10. Make IO part of all pre-deployement training.

11. Additional staff training Change the MTOE and assign CA/PSYOP/IO elements permanantly to the maneuver brigade

12. Get IO/FA30s down to BDE on consistent basis during tng prep, prior to LD.

13. Follow the SBCT lead for leader, soldier tng on what IO is, capabilities, employment.

14. More training for Commanders and Staff.

15. Integrate IO training in all military education from basic to advanced officer schools.

16. Train all staff members, Bde & Bn on IO planning and integration.

17. Leader Skill Training, send designated personnel to IO course.

18. Continue to incorporate robust IO training in Captains Career Courses, CGSC, and PCC.

19. Integrated training at schools (C3, CAS3, CGSC, etc)

20. More familiarization training for soldiers at NCOES and OES and assign a full time IO staff Officer and NCO.

21. Training and education.

22. Educate S2s and S3s on IO operations.

23. Add a separate staff officer School train him and then get him into the field

24. Train all personnel on IO capabilities, not just those assigned to conduct IO

25. Develop routine relationships with CA/PSYOP personnel/team/det.

26. Teach commanders how to give guidance for integration of IO. Staff's can get it done even without a FA30.

27. Post trained personnel in the S-3 section to be a BFA representative/planner on the staff.

28. Evaluate IO activities at CTCs.

29. Permanent S-7 that is FA30.

30. Ensure that S-3 is familiar with the benefits of IO and its impacts on operations.

31. Add to our doctrine in FM 5-0 more detailed guidance on IO across the full spectrum of conflict.

32. Allow DS IO elements - Tactical Psyop Teams, Public Affairs Dets, etc. - to develop some kind of habitual working relationship with maneuver units, perhaps through an occasional CTC rotation. My experience in the Balkans is the first and only time at the Brigade-level or below that I have ever had any exposure to some of the communities that constitute the IO discipline.

33. Train Commanders and Staffs in the general capabilities and benefits of IO Add at least one IO trained officer to tbe BDE staff

34. Organize habitual relations with supporting IO pillar elements

Equipment

1. Team's equipment should include off the shelf bearcat scanners, PROPHET, Bullhorns and portable printing press.

Other Comments

1. Get all MVR BDEs to the same level of digitization.

2. Incoporate IO into the targeting process.

3. Supplement BDE staff with a native language speaking team.

4. Give better guidance.

5. Website Embedded Media

6. Reduce the expectancy that IO operations will guarantee success. Increase the understanding that any monkey can defeat the most sophisticated IO collection asset and nothing will replace human eyes on the objective, NAI, or TAI. IO is a great asset (i.e. a vital part of the battlefield functional areas) but it is not "THE" asset.

7. Consider the civilian advertising community as a learning ground for IO. They've been doing it forever. i.e. send your IO guy TDY to learn real world techniques on how to get a desired response from a target audience.

8. It should probably become a BOS.

9. Senior leaders need to figure out what they want--I get the impression that nobody knows what right looks like.

10. Stop patting yourselves on the back for IO successes that weren't. Just because a PSYOPs mission was executed doesn't mean it was successful or correctly implemented, i.e. dropping portable radios to the Afghans so they could listen to Big Crow broadcasts. Well the "devil is in the details": instead of dropping a radio programmed to the one channel we wanted to listen to, we dropped commericial off the shelf radios not correctly tuned to the correct frequency. Did the Afghans listen to them? I suspect not since they weren't tuned correctly and they tried to sell them to us as soon as

they encountered Americans. Yes I realize this was not really a tactical level operation, but it makes my point. 3. The IO folks at all levels need to understand their role and capabilities (it is more than loudspeakers, leaflets and talking to the locals). The first question for the S7/IO guy needs to ask himself (and the tactical commander) is: "What is the message of this operation I want the civilians and / or enemy to understand or what is the implication or message that will be conveyed." Recommend you talk to Dr. Spencer in A577 COIN/UW; he is a guess instructor from JSOU at Eglin. LTC Meddaugh in the SOF Cell is a good POC to get a hold of this guy. He will give you the guerilla perspective on IO.

11. Develop a better definition of what IO is. It is currently all things to all people therefore making the use of the term and concept ineffective.

12. Can't say- never in a manuever BDE!

APPENDIX K

RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION 21

Twelve respondents provided the following answers to question 21 of the survey. This question asked respondents to provide a reason to the effectiveness of augmenting a unit/staff with IO trained personnel.

1. At the JTF level those placed in charge of IO generally were the least experienced in IO. Even trained IO officers spent entirely too much time in getting into everyone else's business rather than focusing on their primary coordination role. Additionally, they did not bring information or planning tools with them that could have assisted in the overall effort. As the Chief of KFOR PSYOP I spent an inordinate amount of time and resources assisting the IO Cell in doing their job. I had to provide them with planning matrices, translators and transportation. Additionally, I constantly had to reign them in to prevent us from taking on ever more missions. The "good idea fairy" struck daily. The only thing that saved my organization from being run over by "good ideas" was that I had a seat at the table with the 3 Star JTF Commander. Even so, I am a proponent of IO. I believe the IO function is absolutely necessary, even critical to mission success at all levels. However, in order to function correctly, there must be a two way street. The IO staff officer must bring some obvious benefit with him for all concerned else he becomes an unwanted appendage who does not have a clear role in mission success/accomplishment.

2. They assisted in isolating/targeting key personnel.

3. Officer lacked ability to communicate importance of IO to the commander.

4. As with most, it comes down to the commitment of the CDR and the quality of the individuals involved. In my case (CFLCC-OIF) the CDR was fully committed and the quality of the personnel was marginal.

5. Although assigned as the IO "guy"....the officer was not experienced nor confident in his abilities.

6. IO has little impact on direct combat operations (exception is deception). it is in transition and stability that it becomes imperative. it should be planned out well in advance so that when combat ops cease, we can directly transition into stability and let the population (target audience) know the rules and why we are doing whjat we are doing.

7. Some of the IO personnel's training and experience was far better than others.

8. Went through the motions with leaflets, speaker teams etc. Overly reliant on under-analysis from higher HQs regarding IO. Slow reaction time to IO battlefield reqs. or lethargic application of IO at tactical level. Quality of people was mediocre in my opinion, but included their "best and brightest" to include a guy about to take command of a Psyops BN at Fort Bragg. Seems like CA and PSYOPS is a career field for those that were marginally successful in their basic branch. This needs to change.

9. I first dealt with trained IO personnel from LIWA (now IO Cmd) in 1996, in Bosnia. I was a planner and believe the team's success was limited because the team leader (a LTC) was incompetent. In 1999, in Kosovo, I was a planner and the LIWA team's success was a direct result of a very competent Major who was persuasive and energetic in getting the G-3 and Chief of Staff to focus the proper attention on IO

activities, which were directly integrated into operational activities. This success was felt all the way down to platoon level in our AO.

10. During Operation Joint Endeavor I was the Brigade S5 for 1 BCT/ 1AD. One of my responsibilities was working with FA 39 personnel to integrate the DS PSYOP teams into the Brigade's operations. My perspective is that the info products were developed at a level so far removed from the Brigade's recurring activities that PSYOP teams' utility was rather limited. The exceptions that I recall was using the speakers to disperse crowds, some of the IO themes that were run prior to the first elections, and some of the mine awareness materials that the PSYOP teams distributed. I also had limited exposure to IO during OEF and OIF; I was assigned to CFLCC as a C3 Battle Captain. My experience there was that it was exceedingly difficult to develop any meaningful measures of effectiveness to gauge the efficacy of the IO operations.

11. Personnel did not train with the brigade prior to deployment, so there was "breaking in" time period where we weren't sure how to use them.

12. It was JANUS and they gave us credit for at least brining our CA slice. Did little in computer play.

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